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Abstract
Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, government regulators have become
more interested than ever in the significant increase of bank size in the U.S.
financial sector. To shed light on the reasons of the bank size increase and
its effects on banks, we study the dynamic interactions between size, cost
efficiency and returns to scale. Using Fourier flexible form, we show that
banks of all but the largest sizes exhibit increasing returns to scale. As
banks grow, they tend to benefit from cost efficiencies more, but they lose
returns to scale gains. Banks seem to exploit increasing returns to scale
until they become too large; however, they continue to enjoy their cost
efficiency. We also analyze the effects of regulations in the past 25 years
to understand whether imposing (or removing) limits on the size of banks
causes real economic costs. Our findings show that both restrictive and
loose regulations help larger banks but hurt smaller banks by creating extra
costs.
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1 Introduction
The past 25 years have been characterized by heavy regulations (and deregula-
tions) as well as significant increases in bank size. Assets of the five largest banks
as a share of total commercial banking assets increased from 23 percent in 1996
to about 48 percent in 2014.1 In this paper, we investigate the reasons and the
effects of the bank size increase, by analyzing economies of scale and cost effi-
ciency throughout the banking industry. We further study the economic costs of
the regulatory environments in the past 25 years on differently sized banks.
Two of the most important reasons why banks are growing are returns to scale
and cost efficiency gains. Although the earlier literature has mixed results on scale
economies, recent literature has found increasing returns to scale for most banks.2
For instance, Wheelock and Wilson (2012) and Hughes and Mester (2013) find
significant economies of scale for even the largest banks. Thus, returns to scale
can encourage banks to grow. Cost efficiency, i.e. the ratio of total noninterest
expenses to total assets, might be another related factor driving the size increase
in the banking sector. In fact, Kovner et al. (2014) find that every 10 percent
increase in bank assets is associated with 0.3 to 0.6 percent decrease in noninter-
est expenses. We complement and contribute to this literature by analyzing the
dynamic relationship between size, returns to scale, and cost efficiency through a
Panel and Bayesian Panel VAR from 1992:3 to 2014:2.
Using Fourier flexible form model, we first show that all but the largest banks
exhibit increasing returns to scale. Then we demonstrate that an increase in total
assets leads to an increase in cost efficiency but a decrease in returns to scale.
Banks seem to exploit increasing returns to scale until they become too large;
1Data are obtained from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), The World
Bank.
2Schweitzer (1972), Noulas et al. (1990) and Hunter et al. (1990) find increasing returns to
scale for all but the largest banks, which exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Similarly, McAllister
and McManus (1993) and Wheelock and Wilson (2001) find increasing returns to scale for most
banks but constant returns to scale for the largest banks.
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however, they continue to benefit from cost efficiency gains.
The regulatory environment might also play an important role in the observed
size increase of the banking sector. For example, regulations that gave more
freedom to bank holding companies (such as Gramm-Leach-Bliley) likely resulted
in cost synergies through an increase in merger activity, particularly for larger
banks. Dodd-Frank, which is more restrictive, may have helped the banks by
reducing the risk, but it may also have imposed costs on banks. To more effectively
address whether bank size alters the costs arising from regulations, we use the cost
decomposition data from the largest 198 commercial bank holding companies and
account for each pertinent regulatory period. We find that both restrictive and
loose regulations tend to benefit larger banks but hurt smaller banks.
2 Bank Regulations and Their Effects on Costs
and Returns to Scale
The literature on the effects of regulations on bank costs is extensive, but many
papers focus either on a country’s general policies at a given point in time (such
as Barth et al. (2004)) or focus on earlier regulatory periods (such as Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002)). These discussions help reinforce the connection
between returns to scale and regulation; however, they provide little in helping
to formulate expectations for how returns to scale and costs respond specifically
to more recent regulatory periods in the United States. By focusing on the three
banking regulations over the past 25 years, we can pinpoint the precise regulatory
environment that affects returns to scale and bank costs. The following sections
give details on these specific regulations and provide evidence on how they could
affect bank costs and scale economies.
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2.1 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act
The Riegle-Neal Act was passed in 1994 and is still in effect today. In September
1994, Congress enacted the Riegle-Neal Act, allowing bank holding companies to
acquire banks across state lines regardless of individual state laws (this provision
became active on September 30, 1995). In addition, on June 1, 1997, the bill
permitted interstate mergers of pre-existing banks.
Cornett et al. (2006) analyze the effects of Riegle-Neal on bank profits. They
measure a number of variables related to costs and revenues both before and after
bank mergers completed during the period from 1990 to 2000. They find that
majority of mergers occurred after the passage of Riegle-Neal. This conclusion
echoes the findings of Chronopoulus et al. (2015) that bank sizes grew substan-
tially after Riegle-Neal. Cornett et al. (2006), on the other hand, measure how
the costs and revenues of banks changed after mergers following the Riegle-Neal
Act. The authors conclude that increases in short-term profitability were higher
in mergers that occurred in the period after Riegle-Neal was enacted due to cost
synergies from consolidating operations.
2.2 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted on November 12, 1999, with the inten-
tion of repealing the Glass-Steagall Act. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allowed
banks to maintain both investment and commercial banking divisions. Chronopoulous
et al. (2015) discuss the effects that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act had on bank
profit persistence. Unlike the Riegle-Neal Act, the authors find that the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act actually reduced competition by spurring consolidations that had
previously been not allowed. This reduction in competition led to profit persis-
tence increasing post-passage of the act. Chronopoulous et al. (2015) further show
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that the merger activity following the Act caused an increase in bank size. Barth
et al. (2000 and 2004) discuss the potential effects of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act on bank costs. They argue that bank costs would be reduced, primarily from
the cost synergies associated with combining investment and commercial banking
facilities. For example, a commercial bank could leverage its current telecom-
munications and data processing divisions to include the sales of insurance and
securities for low additional costs.
2.3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act
The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010, and is still in effect
today. The Dodd-Frank was signed following the worst recessionary period in
the recent U.S. history. This recession was spurred, in part, by loose regulations
governing financial institutions’ securitization businesses. Over 2,000 pages long,
Dodd-Frank reform aims to limit the risks that banks take and helps minimize the
severe results from bank failures.
Dodd-Frank contains a number of clauses giving the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) power in cases of perceived insolvency. More specifically, if
regulators determine that a bank’s imminent default could have severe economic
implications, regulators may submit an appeal requesting control over the bank in
question. The Dodd-Frank effectively gives the FDIC the ability to navigate the
troubled bank through the default and liquidation processes. The FDIC, being
more concerned with controlling economic shocks than with returning equity to
shareholders, should cause fewer shocks in the economy than would the banking
heads, were they to remain in control of their company. However, with the FDIC
presumably putting the interests of shareholders second, the bank could have a
more difficult time raising capital. Thus, this clause could actually destabilize the
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banking industry due to reduced liquidity from limited access to capital markets.
Dodd-Frank also aims to reduce risk by placing regulations on institutions and on
the instruments that can be traded.
In order to reduce institutional risk, Dodd-Frank focuses primarily on the
bank holding companies that are more likely to cause significant economic shocks
(those banks with over $50 billion in assets). The regulation imposes a number of
controls on the size and quality of reserves that these large institutions are required
to hold. The increase in held reserves creates a significant buffer, preventing
liquidity shocks that had previously damaged bank holding companies. Dodd-
Frank regulation also prohibits a single bank holding company controlling more
than 10 percent of total liabilities of all financial institutions which effectively
imposes a limit on the size of banks and restricts bank mergers and acquisitions.
Wheelock and Wilson (2012) and Kovner et al. (2014) demonstrate that limiting
size of banks causes significant increases in bank costs, primarily because banks
exhibit increasing returns to scale. Berger and Hannan (1998), however, contradict
this point with a discussion of the “quiet life” hypothesis. Under this hypothesis,
banks in highly concentrated markets will collude and have little incentive to
compete and cut costs. In other words, if the size of market concentration is
restricted, bank costs are likely to be reduced. Berger and Hannan (1998) test this
hypothesis and find that reducing market concentration decreased bank operating
costs by 8 to 32 percent. Based on these interpretations, we can conclude that the
effects of Dodd-Frank on bank costs and returns to scale are not binary. Despite
the lack of a conclusion, a dichotomy between Dodd-Frank and the other acts is
obvious here: While the Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Riegle-Neal Acts gave banks
more freedom, Dodd-Frank added more restrictions.
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3 Data
Our dataset consists of 15 operating expenses for 198 commercial bank holding
companies from 1992:3 to 2014:2. The dataset captures the largest publicly traded
bank holding companies with assets valued at over $300 million as ranked by the
December 2007 Federal Reserve Board Report.3 Individual bank income state-
ments and balance sheets are obtained from the Mergent Online database. In or-
der to assess costs more efficiently, we divide these operating expenses into three
general categories: Fixed, quasi-fixed, and variable costs. Fixed costs include
occupancy, supplies, printing, software, and equipment expenses. Quasi-fixed
costs include personnel and employee benefits. Variable costs include market-
ing, telecommunications, litigation, data processing, loan processing, professional
fees, postal and courier, and other noninterest expenses.4
Following Jaremski and Sapci (2014), we control for macroeconomic variables
that could affect the bank size. For instance, we control for real GDP and indus-
trial production, representing the overall health of the economy. We also control
for the inflation rate (CPI inflation) and money supply (M2) for the effects of
monetary policy. Last, we include the Dow Jones Industrial Average to control
for the health of the financial markets and the Case-Shiller U.S. National Home
Price Index to control for house prices.
Figure 1a plots each bank’s average assets for the period, whereas Figure 1b
displays the percentage change in average asset size across banks. Using the
average assets size of a bank compared to their nearest neighbor, we divide the
banks into four groups: Too-big-to-fail (TBTF henceforth), large, medium and
small banks. In particular, bank holding companies with an average asset size of
over $20 billion made up the TBTF group, between $2.5 billion and $20 billion
3We use the rankings before the Great Recession to account for the banks that did not survive
after the turmoil.
4Please refer to Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the dataset.
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made up the large group, between $500 million and $2.5 billion made up the
medium group, and under $500 million made up the smallest bank category. Tables
4 through 7 in Appendix A.1.2 show the summary statistics of cost decomposition
data for the different bank groups.
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Figure 1: Bank Size Groups
To assess the range of cost efficiency over time and across bank groups of dif-
ferent sizes, Figure 2 plots the average value of total noninterest expenses divided
by total assets for the 1992:3 to 2014:2 period.5 Interestingly, small and medium
commercial bank holding companies appear to become more cost efficient over
time, whereas the TBTF and large commercial bank holding companies experi-
enced declines in their cost efficiency since mid 1990s. This analysis shows that
there is some heterogeneity among banks in terms of cost efficiency gains.
5It is important to note that total noninterest expenses divided by assets is a measure of cost
inefficiency. Throughout the paper, lower values always denote higher cost efficiency.
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(d) Too-Big-To-Fail Banks
Figure 2: Cost Efficiency Across Time for Different Bank Groups
4 Empirical Models
4.1 Fourier Flexible Form
The Fourier flexible form represents a semi-nonparametric approach which is use-
ful when the true functional form of the cost function is unknown. Because sine
and cosine functions are orthogonal within the 0 to 2pi range, an infinite series
of sines and cosines with varying frequencies can accurately represent any con-
tinuously differentiable function. Because of computational and dimensionality
limits, an infinite Fourier series (which would be a fully nonparametric estimate)
is not feasible. A finite Fourier series, however, is semi-nonparametric and (un-
like, for instance, the Translog cost function) is a global approximation of the cost
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function.6 The Fourier flexible form used in this paper is presented below:
lnC ≈ βo + βQ lnQ+
∑
m
βm ln pm +
∑
n
τn ln pn lnQ+
1
2
∑
m
∑
n
δmn ln pm ln pn
+
1
2
γ lnQ2 +
N∑
i=1
[ζi sin(kiV ) + φi cos(kiV )] + At + ui + ei,t (1)
Where C is total costs, Q is the vector of outputs, p is the vector presenting
input prices, ki is a vector of integer values and V is a vector of the logged input
and output quantities and At is the vector containing macroeconomic controls as
well as bank regulation dummy variables.7 Lastly, ui is a vector of bank-fixed
effects. In the case of bank holding companies, a firm’s total loans will serve as a
measure of a bank’s output. The inputs for a firm’s production function are labor,
capital, and deposits. The amount of labor is specified by the sum of employee
benefits and personnel costs. The amount of capital is a sum of the supplies and
printing, software, occupancy, and equipment expenses.
In order for the Fourier flexible form to accurately measure returns to scale,
several criteria must be fulfilled. In particular, the input and output variables
must be transformed so that they vary within the interval [0,2pi]. In terms of
choosing ki, there is no substantial literature on it; however, we follow the criteria
laid out in Skolrud (2013) and use a 6fh order Fouries series expansion. To ensure
orthogonality between the cosine and sine terms, all values within the ki vectors
must be integers. In order to maintain linear homogeneity, the sum of all the
βm coefficients must be 1. Put simply, this restriction ensures that, should each
operating cost be multiplied by some scalar constant, the total cost will change
by the same constant. In other words: λC = C(Q, λp); the cost function must
6We also analyzed returns to scale of banks using Translog cost function. Both Translog and
Fourier provide similar conclusions. Translog cost function results are available upon request.
7Note that the dummy variables take the value of zero before a regulation was enacted and
one in all periods thereafter.
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be homogeneous of degree one. From the arguments of linear homogeneity and
symmetry, it follows that the τ and δ coefficients must also sum to zero. The
addition of the vector V means restrictions must also be imposed on the values of
ki. In particular, the sum of ki integers, which are multiplied with input prices,
must equal zero. This restriction ensures that λC = C(Q, λp) is still satisfied
when using the Fourier flexible form.
Returns to scale measures can be obtained from the Fourier flexible form by
taking a partial derivative with respect to the natural log of output:
∂ lnC
∂ lnQ
= βQ +
∑
n
τn ln pn + γ lnQ+
N∑
i=1
ki,Q [ζi cos(kiV )− φi sin(kiV )] (2)
This partial derivative gives the change in cost resulting from an increase or
decrease in output. If this number is one, then cost is perfectly correlated with
output and commercial bank holding companies exhibit constant returns to scale.
Along the same argument, a value higher than one yields decreasing returns to
scale, and less than one yields increasing returns to scale.
4.2 Panel Vector Autoregression (PVAR)
VAR, or vector autoregressive models, are those that project a given variable’s
current value as a function of its lagged values and lagged values of other variables.
VAR models are particularly useful because all input variables are treated as
endogenously determined and interdependent. With purely time-series data, the
general equation for a vector autoregressive model can be written as
Xt = β0 + Γ1Xt−1 + Γ2Xt−2 + ...+ ΓmXt−m + t (3)
Where Xt is an (nx1) vector of endogenous variables at some time t. The
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vectors on the right-hand side of the equation represent lagged values of the (nx1)
vector. The Γ’s represent (nxn) coefficient matrices and the  term is an i.i.d.
(nx1) vector of error terms. The number of lags is equal to m, the value of
which we determine by Akaike and Schwartz information criteria. Written in
a more accessible format below is an example of an n-variable, two-lag vector
autoregression:

x1,t
x2,t
...
xn,t

= β0+

γ11,1 γ
1
1,2 · · · γ11,n
γ12,1 γ
1
2,2 · · · γ12,n
...
...
. . .
...
γ1n,1 γ
1
n,2 · · · γ1n,n


x1,t−1
x2,t−1
...
xn,t−1

+

γ21,1 γ
2
1,2 · · · γ21,n
γ22,1 γ
2
2,2 · · · γ22,n
...
...
. . .
...
γ2n,1 γ
2
n,2 · · · γ2n,n


x1,t−2
x2,t−2
...
xn,t−2

+

1,t
2,t
...
n,t

(4)
It is straightforward to see that the above equation can be extrapolated to
any number of lags given the addition of more matrices. Presented thus far have
only been vector autoregressions for use with times series data. Given that our
data consist of 198 commercial bank holding companies across 24 years, we must
extrapolate our time series model to work with a panel dataset. The econometric
application of a PVAR model is slightly more complicated, but the theoretical
extension to a panel dataset can be written compactly as
Xi,t = βi,0 + Γi,1Xi,t−1 + Γi,2Xi,t−2 + ...+ Γi,mXi,t−m + i,t (5)
For our purposes, the most useful information from the PVAR comes in the
form of impulse response functions. Impulse response functions measure the re-
sponses of current and future values of each variable to a shock, defined as a unit
increase in the current value of one of the variables. For our VAR model, the
shock will be a change in row n of the (nx1)  column vector. Because of the in-
terpendencies that characterize a PVAR, this shock will likely affect all variables
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in Xt. The response over time of the Xt variables creates the impulse response
functions. In general, the n shock imposed is the size of the standard deviation
of variable xn. In addition, all variables are typically normalized to have a value
equal to zero prior to the shock.
For commercial bank holding companies, PVAR is particularly interesting be-
cause the parameters that characterize an impulse response function will show the
effects that an increase in assets have on cost efficiency and returns to scale.
4.3 Bayesian Panel VAR
All forms of regression analysis contain bias based on a researcher’s prior beliefs.
In order to develop a strong model, the researcher will select variables and, in some
cases, even the form of the model (when the model is parametric). While this is a
typical frequentist approach in estimation, it does impose the researcher’s biases
on the model. The Bayesian form of estimation helps fix this issue by assuming
that model parameters are random quantities. Bayesian analysis is contrasted by
frequentist analysis, which instead assumes that the data are a random sample
of the global data but that the parameters are fixed and unknown. By assuming
that the model’s parameters are random, Bayesian analysis allows the researcher
to incorporate prior knowledge in the estimation process. These priors are a
researcher’s best estimate of the distribution of the model’s parameters before
any regressions have been run. These prior distributions are then updated in a
series of simulations until a final posterior distribution is determined. This form of
estimation gives a more robust result than frequentist analysis because Bayesian
estimation uses both data on hand and prior knowledge. Bayesian analysis will
serve as a robustness check for our results obtained through a frequentist PVAR.
In Bayesian analysis, the posterior has two components: a likelihood function,
which contains information about the parameters from observed data, and a prior,
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which contains information about the parameters from other sources. The pos-
terior distribution generally cannot be solved for analytically, as it typically does
not have a closed-form solution. Thus, to find the posterior solution one must use
Markow Chain Monte Carlo sampling to approximate the distribution. Despite
the differences in their theoretical basis, the form of the Bayesian PVAR is equiva-
lent to that of Equation (5) used in PVAR, the only difference being the additional
reliance on priors and the determination of a solution through estimation.
5 Results
5.1 Measurements of Returns to Scale
First, we use the Fourier flexible form to determine the returns to scale for each
banks size group. The estimates of ∂ lnC/∂ lnQ are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Returns to Scale (RTS) Measurements from the Fourier Flexible Form
Size RTS
Too-Big-To-Fail Banks 2.013
Large Banks 0.106
Mid-Size Banks 0.093
Small Banks 0.526
Notes: RTS higher than one yields decreasing returns to scale, and less than one
yields increasing returns to scale.
Table 1 shows that the largest commercial bank holding companies in our
study exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Our results are consistent with the
previous research which find increasing returns to scale up to a particular size
limit. Although each size category exhibits increasing returns to scale, the medium
commercial bank holding companies exhibit the largest returns to scale compared
to large and small commercial bank holding companies showing a non-monotonic
distribution of returns to scale.
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Table 2: The Effects of Different Regulations on Total Cost
Variables
Fourier Flexible Form
RN GLB DF
TBTF -0.858∗∗∗ 0.313 0.242
(0.262) (0.261) (0.234)
Large 0.039 -0.263∗∗∗ -0.051
(0.099) (0.094) (0.082)
Medium 0.020 0.029 -0.033
(0.031) (0.028) (0.027)
Small 0.064 0.071∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.039) (0.035)
Notes: Here ***, **, and * denote the 5, 1, and 0.1 percent levels of significance,
respectively. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
Next, we turn to assessing the role that the banking regulations play in total
costs banks incur. Interestingly, we find that the total costs of small commercial
bank holding companies increased significantly as a result of Dodd-Frank legisla-
tion. This result is surprising because the Dodd-Frank legislation was marketed
as a way to reduce banking risk, specifically for the largest U.S¿ commercial bank
holding companies. Although the coefficients are insignificant, the total costs for
TBTF has increased as expected, yet it decreased for large and medium com-
mercial bank holding companies after the Dodd-Frank. The largest commercial
bank holding companies (TBTF and large) benefited the most from legislation
that granted commercial bank holding companies more freedom (Riegle-Neal and
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) while smaller bank holding companies hurt most in
terms of cost increases. We can conclude that restrictive bank regulations, even
those which are targeted towards the largest commercial bank holding companies,
have the most significant negative effect on the smallest commercial bank holding
companies.
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5.2 Panel VAR (PVAR) Results
PVAR allows the study of the interaction between bank size, cost efficiency, and re-
turns to scale. Since each of these variables are interrelated, and thus endogenous,
PVAR is the best estimation model for this dynamic relationship. The variables
used in our PVAR are cost efficiency, bank size (measured as total assets), and
returns to scale. Although we can observe shocks to each endogenous variable, we
are most interested in how a bank’s returns to scale and cost efficiency respond
to a growth in total assets. This analysis is particularly important, as Wheelock
and Wilson (2012) as well as others find that returns to scale differ for firms of
different sizes, while Kovner et al. (2014) conclude similarly for the cost efficiency.
Because we use a panel dataset, we address the issues relating to bank fixed ef-
fects by using Helmert transformation. The use of vector autoregressive models
in returns to scale and bank cost efficiency research is novel, and it represents our
contribution to the field.
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Figure 3: PVAR IRFs: Responses of Cost Efficiency and Returns to Scale After
a Standard Deviation Increase in Assets
A shock to a firm’s size both increases cost efficiency (decreases cost to asset
ratio) and decreases returns to scale (increases in the partial derivative of costs
relative to output). While the returns to scale findings match the previous liter-
ature, the cost efficiency findings are consistent with Kovner et al. (2014), where
the authors find that an increase in firm size is associated with an increase in cost
16
efficiency.
5.3 Bayesian Panel VAR Results
We obtain posterior distributions for the Bayesian PVAR using Metropolis-Hastings
MCMC sampling. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm requires initial prior distri-
butions for each coefficient in the Bayesian PVAR. The posterior distribution of
these coefficients is then updated through a series of iterations.8 To deal with the
issue of bank fixed effects, we again apply a Helmert transformation to each of the
variables used.9
Figure 4: Bayesian PVAR IRFs: Responses of Cost Efficiency and Returns to
Scale to a Standard Deviation Increase in Assets.
The conclusions drawn from the Bayesian PVAR impulse responses are con-
sistent with those of the PVAR IRFs. An increase in total assets increases cost
efficiency while decreasing returns to scale.
8The posterior distribution was based on 1 million MCMC iterations (of which the first
500,000 were discarded). As few as 100,000 iterations were also tested, and in all cases (with
iterations between 1,000,000 and 100,000) all convergence criteria were met.
9Please refer to A.2 for the prior and posterior coefficient distributions for each of the nine
variables included in the Bayesian PVAR.
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5.4 Robustness Checks
First, we test our findings using a balanced panel dataset for the period of 1998:1
to 2014:2 to understand whether the unbalanced nature of the dataset affects the
results. We find that returns to scale and PVAR results are very similar under a
balanced dataset as seen in Figure 5. This analysis shows that failed banks in our
period do not seem to skew our findings.
Next, we use the recovery period between the 2001 and 2007 recessions, i.e.
the period from 2002:1 to 2007:3, to determine whether recessionary periods are
leading to any biases. We find similar conclusions in terms of returns to scale
and PVAR results. Using data exclusively from 2002:1 to 2007:3, Figure 6 shows
that our conclusions are robust regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of the
recessionary periods.
As was previously mentioned, once banks are placed in a given size category,
they do not leave that group regardless of whether they grow larger or smaller
over time. Using bank average real assets, we establish groups which banks could
enter or leave across time. Allowing banks to change groups does not change the
main conclusions of the paper.
Recognizing that our results could be influenced by the controls that we select,
we run both the PVAR with and without macroeconomic controls as can be seen
in Figure 7. The conclusions drawn from running the PVAR without controls are
the same as when the PVAR was run with controls.
While our model is based on the most conservative ordering, we changed the
Cholesky ordering in our PVAR estimation to account for ordering effects.10 We
note that the model is robust to ordering: a change in the variable order has no
significant effects on the IRFs.
10For our model, the most conservative order is total assets, cost efficiency, and returns to
scale.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we try to understand the underlying reasons why banks have been
growing larger for 25 years. In particular, we ask the following two questions: If
a bank grows larger in size, would it benefit from scale economies and/or cost
efficiency gains? Do dissimilar regulatory environments affect banks differently
by lessening (or increasing) costs which could in turn encourage (or discourage)
banks to grow? To answer these questions, we study the effects of an increase in
bank size on returns to scale and cost efficiency gains.
Knowing that banks are heterogeneous, we first divide our dataset into four
groups based on bank asset sizes. Using the Fourier flexible form, we find that
all but the largest banks exhibit increasing returns to scale. Next, we analyze
the dynamic relationship between bank size, returns to scale, and cost efficiency
through Panel VAR and Bayesian Panel VAR analyses. Both methods show that
an increase in bank size decreases the chances that a bank can exploit returns to
scale. On the other hand, cost efficiency gains increase as size increases. Thus,
banks seem to exploit increasing returns to scale up until they become too large;
however, they continue to benefit from cost efficiency gains even when they are
the largest size.
We further analyze the role of different regulatory environments and study
whether the regulations impose (or lessens) costs on banks. In particular, we con-
centrate on the past 25 years and cover more freeing regulations such as Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act as
well as a more restrictive regulation like the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. Both type of regulations seem to benefit larger banks
but hurt smaller banks in terms of increasing operating costs. In particular, the
largest commercial bank holding companies benefit more from the most flexible
regulations, whereas the smaller commercial bank holding companies are generally
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hurt more by the most restrictive regulations. This is an interesting result because
the most restrictive regulation (Dodd-Frank) is generally focused on the largest
commercial bank holding companies. However, Dodd-Frank seemed to have a sig-
nificant influence on the costs of the smallest commercial bank holding companies.
Our results suggest that regulators must consider the auxiliary implications of reg-
ulations on commercial bank holding companies that may not be in their target
group.
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A Appendices
A.1 Data
A.1.1 Data Definition and Measurement
Mergent Online obtains their data from FR Y-9C filings, which must be filled out
quarterly by bank holding companies with over 500 million USD in assets (more
information on these requirements can be found in the Bank Holding Company
Act, Regulation Y, and the Homeowners Loan Act). In FR Y-9C filings, Schedule
HI, item 7 contains a list of possible noninterest expenses a bank holding company
could incur: salaries and employee benefits, expenses of premises and fixed assets,
goodwill impairment, amortization expenses, other noninterest expenses, and to-
tal noninterest expenses. In addition, Schedule HI, memoranda item 7 contains
several more possible expenses: data processing, advertising and marketing, direc-
tor’s fees, printing and supplies, postage, legal fees and expenses, FDIC deposit
insurance assessments, accounting and auditing expenses, consulting and advisory
expenses, interchange fees, and telecommunications expenses. Under this memo-
randa item, bank holding companies are also able to create additional accounts.
The Federal Reserve Microdata Reference Manual lays out the definition of costs
reported in FR Y-9C filings. Some of the largest operating costs definitions that
we use in this paper are shown in Table 3.
Many of the bank holding companies in our dataset contain several quarters
where data is unavailable for certain expenses. Often, missing data are a result of
a company switching accounting procedures. If a missing quarter occurs between
quarters containing data, the missing entry is replaced with an average of the
quarters before and after the entry as long as the missing entries do not exceed
three for the entire sample.
Since banks do not provide individual financial statements for their fourth-
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quarters, we obtained fourth quarter noninterest expenses by summing the three
available quarters and subtracting the total from the similar cost presented in
the annual reports. We paid special attention to matching the quarterly financial
statements with annual statements for every bank and each year. When we fail
to do so, we obtained missing fourth-quarter values by averaging the preceding
third-quarter and following first-quarter values. If this adjustment is made for
more than three years, however, we remove the bank from our dataset.
The cost decomposition data used in this paper are far more detailed than the
reports that are regulated by the SEC.11 Thus, sometimes, bank holding companies
had slightly different methods of reporting their detailed financial information.
Two such categories that required the most careful analysis were the personnel and
occupancy expenses. For personnel, some banks report only salaries paid (breaking
employee benefits into a separate account), whereas other holding companies would
report only one general category. Similarly, some companies choose to group their
occupancy costs with their equipment costs. Because the personnel and occupancy
data were the largest cost categories, we combined the equipment and occupancy
into one category and personnel and employee benefits costs into another for each
bank holding company in our dataset.
Table 3: Cost Decomposition and Descriptions
Variable Description
Personnel salaries and benefits for all officers and employees of the bank and its
consolidated subsidiaries.
Occupancy all noninterest expenses related to the use of premises, equipment, fur-
niture, and fixtures. Premises and fixed assets are defined net of rental
income. In addition to rental deductions, income from assets that indi-
rectly represent premises, equipment, furniture, or fixtures included in
“Premises and Fixed Assets” are also deducted.
Advertising and
Marketing
advertising, production, agency fees, direct mail, marketing research,
public relations, seminars, and customer magazines.
Professional Fees sales training by consultants, public accountants’ fees, management ser-
vices, consulting fees for economic surveys, and other special advisory
services.
11Please refer to the Tables from 4 to 7 for detailed cost breakdown
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Other Noninterest
Expenses
Other noninterest expenses is a category intended to include items not
required to be reported individually in Schedule HI, item 7. The Federal
Reserve Microdata Reference Manual lists 31 unique costs that should
be included in other noninterest expenses. Some of these costs include
civil penalties and fines as well as costs of gifts given to depositors.
A.1.2 Summary Statistics
Below are our tables showing the different summary statistics for TBTF, large,
medium, and small commercial bank holding companies.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Too-Big-Too-Fail Banks
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Insurance Exp 0 . . . .
Supp. and Print 0 . . . .
Software Exp 32 106406 31925 53000 157000
Occupancy Exp 412 710902 612148 51200 2406000
Marketing Exp 221 321462 246331 10000 926000
Data Processing Exp 66 447955 223402 107000 856000
Loan Processing Exp 0 . . . .
Prof. Services Exp 263 492191 507096 6424 2109000
Litigation Exp 0 . . . .
Telecommunications Exp 301 411710 382001 32700 1646000
Travel Exp 0 . . . .
Postal and Courier Exp 23 36820 13125 19324 67000
Card Processing Exp 0 . . . .
Personnel Exp 435 3400753 2671402 108800 1.02e+07
Other Noninterest Exp 415 1611499 1744373 51000 1.31e+07
Total Noninterest Exp 526 6437326 5209732 253472 2.72e+07
Total Deposits 522 3.53e+08 3.48e+08 22000 1.32e+09
Gross Loans 465 3.22e+08 2.95e+08 475000 9.77e+08
Total Assets 546 7.68e+08 6.98e+08 2.12e+07 2.52e+09
Number of Banks 7
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Large Banks
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Insurance Exp 0 . . . .
Supp. and Print 205 4779 2761 826 11872
Software Exp 171 47077 54013 3523 190000
Occupancy Exp 1673 77899 67253 681 447000
Marketing Exp 770 54175 79668 1060 511142
Data Processing Exp 315 58086 53740 4140 233000
Loan Processing Exp 48 49583 21035 26000 111000
Prof. Services Exp 857 54415 73099 220 518000
Litigation Exp 0 . . . .
Telecommunications Exp 504 54993 59672 4126 266200
Travel Exp 0 . . . .
Postal and Courier Exp 68 47027 31196 7432 81000
Card Processing Exp 70 115500 51452 44000 193000
Personnel Exp 1722 324001 260935 3430 1404000
Other Noninterest Exp 1113 116330 140158 1222 1218000
Total Noninterest Exp 1839 662793 589071 5520 7273350
Total Deposits 1685 4.95e+07 4.49e+07 452201 2.76e+08
Gross Loans 1504 4.87e+07 4.26e+07 1734832 2.44e+08
Total Assets 1832 7.54e+07 6.67e+07 2047633 3.89e+08
Number of Banks 25
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Medium-Sized Banks
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Insurance Exp 108 2791 1725 107 8589
Supp. and Print 432 2046 1729 366 6292
Software Exp 36 5646 3804 1704 11087
Occupancy Exp 3144 12366 12195 114 120213
Marketing Exp 1515 3131 2943 80 24870
Data Processing Exp 885 5605 5396 117 29071
Loan Processing Exp 208 4686 4342 577 40786
Prof. Services Exp 1453 4331 4083 242 29905
Litigation Exp 43 4008 2751 855 12806
Telecommunications Exp 632 3916 4406 129 31000
Travel Exp 114 2766 2138 622 10194
Postal and Courier Exp 400 3434 3669 165 15960
Card Processing Exp 71 5733 3913 1686 16018
Personnel Exp 3469 42467 39139 1028 362340
Other Noninterest Exp 2694 14170 13255 156 113300
Total Noninterest Exp 3665 81385 76686 1410 754678
Total Deposits 3553 7382313 5338367 301673 4.65e+07
Gross Loans 3389 6297472 4576498 43801 2.80e+07
Total Assets 3565 9973001 7160884 386737 5.00e+07
Number of Banks 54
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for Small Banks
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Insurance Exp 156 637 610 11 3330
Supp. and Print 886 303 154 58 885
Software Exp 83 789 239 379 1575
Occupancy Exp 6204 2526 2616 41 42967
Marketing Exp 2477 657 564 0 10977
Data Processing Exp 2700 1052 1463 0 23161
Loan Processing Exp 38 281 204 61 1044
Prof. Services Exp 2232 1081 1060 6 10816
Litigation Exp 189 493 353 28 2001
Telecommunications Exp 1052 1300 2970 51 26122
Travel Exp 18 191 42 128 305
Postal and Courier Exp 561 480 300 25 1340
Card Processing Exp 268 730 582 90 2746
Personnel Exp 6709 10530 17476 67 395936
Other Noninterest Exp 5237 3530 3500 0 69911
Total Noninterest Exp 7140 19561 26843 1 482944
Total Deposits 6872 1792173 1289990 4801 1.20e+07
Gross Loans 6461 1573544 1158160 341 1.09e+07
Total Assets 6944 2332048 1725824 10161 1.53e+07
Number of Banks 101
28
A.2 Bayesian Panel VAR Priors and Posteriors
Table 8: Distributions Where Total Assets is Dependent Variable
Variable Prior (µ, σ2) Posterior (µ, σ2)
L1.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (0.863, 1.97e-04)
L2.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (0.096, 3.49e-04)
L3.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (0.007, 1.92e-04)
L1.RTS N(0,10xσ) (0.019, 1.81e-04)
L2.RTS N(0,10xσ) (0.000, 3.18e-04)
L3.RTS N(0,10xσ) (-0.030, 1.71e-04)
L1.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (-0.002, 2.72e-05)
L2.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (-0.012, 2.67e-05)
L3.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (0.009, 2.71e-05)
Table 9: Distributions Where RTS is Dependent Variable
Variable Prior (µ, σ2) Posterior (µ, σ2)
L1.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (0.008, 2.04e-04)
L2.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (-0.030, 3.58e-04)
L3.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (0.048, 1.93e-04)
L1.RTS N(0,10xσ) (0.905, 1.89e-04)
L2.RTS N(0,10xσ) (0.189, 3.26e-04)
L3.RTS N(0,10xσ) (-0.163, 1.74e-04)
L1.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (0.007, 2.73e-05)
L2.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (-0.002, 2.64e-05)
L3.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (-0.010, 2.70e-05)
Table 10: Distributions Where Cost Efficiency is Dependent Variable
Variable Prior (µ, σ2) Posterior (µ, σ2)
L1.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (-0.046, 0.001)
L2.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (-0.011, 0.002)
L3.Total Assets N(0,10xσ) (0.028, 0.001)
L1.RTS N(0,10xσ) (-0.031, 0.001)
L2.RTS N(0,10xσ) (0.061, 0.002)
L3.RTS N(0,10xσ) (-0.015, 0.001)
L1.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (0.276, 1.70e-04)
L2.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (0.337, 1.66e-04)
L3.Cost Efficiency N(0,10xσ) (0.159, 1.68e-04)
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A.3 Robustness Checks
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Figure 5: PVAR IRFs measuring cost efficiency and returns to scale after a total
asset shock with data for 2002:1-2007:3, excluding recessions.
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Figure 6: PVAR IRFs measuring cost efficiency and returns to scale after a total
asset shock with a balanced dataset and data from 1998:1-2014:2.
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Figure 7: PVAR IRFs measuring cost efficiency and returns to scale after a total
asset shock with the entire dataset, including macroeconomic controls.
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